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Social protection







Confronted with recurrent macroeconomic shocks, govern-
ments in Latin America and the Caribbean have increasingly
been concerned about establishing or strengthening systems
of social protection and safety net programmes. The goal of
these programmes is to help mitigate the impact of shocks
on the poor before they occur, and to help the poor cope
with the shocks once they have occurred. In this paper, we
focus on publicly funded or mandated safety nets function-
ing as risk-coping mechanisms. The paper reviews the char-
acteristics of a good safety net, in comparison with the main
types of safety nets currently in place, and finds in general
that no single programme meets all of the criteria in terms
of efficiency and effectiveness, although some are better than
others. Finally, what has been the actual record in terms of
protecting the poor through targeted public spending dur-
ing crises? The paper finds that because of fiscal constraints
during a crisis, social spending is often pro-cyclical when
ideally it should be counter-cyclical. Ironically enough, so-
cial protection spending itself does not appear to be pro-
tected.
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I
The context: persistent poverty and vulnerability
to macroeconomic shocks
The Latin American and Caribbean region has been
plagued by macroeconomic shocks over the last twenty
years, with serious consequences for the poor (see
Glewwe and Hall, 1998; Lustig (ed.), 1995; Lustig,
1999; Ganuza, Taylor and Morley, 1998). Such shocks
are so-called “covariant” shocks (Holzmann and
Jorgensen, 1999) which affect the real incomes of a
large share of the population, typically through a
reduction in both real hourly wages (via inflation) and
the number of hours worked (via unemployment or
underemployment). Beyond these income effects,
which may vanish once growth resumes,
macroeconomic shocks may also have longer-term
consequences. For example, the reduction in the
quantity and quality of public health care due to
budgetary cuts during a crisis may induce irreparable
damage. Also, when coping with a crisis, parents may
send their children to work in order to compensate for
their own loss of income. If there is substitution between
child labour and schooling, and if the children do not
return to school at a later stage, they will incur long-
term wage losses due to their lower endowment with
human capital (Wodon and Siaens, 2000). All this may
help explain why De Janvry and Sadoulet (1999) find
evidence that the increase in poverty that follows a
macroeconomic shock may be larger than the
subsequent reduction in poverty with growth.
There are signs that the reforms enacted in many
countries of the region in the 1990s have been bearing
at least some fruits. Wodon (2000a) estimates that in
1996, slightly more than one-third of the population of
the region (36.7%) was poor (i.e., not able to cover
their basic food and non-food needs), and one out of
every six persons (16.1%) was extremely poor (i.e., not
able to cover even their basic food needs). This
represents some progress compared with 1992, when
the incidences of poverty and extreme poverty were
both higher. However, the absolute number of the poor
has not been reduced to the same extent, due to
population growth. Moreover, if the comparison is made
with 1986 instead of 1992, the numbers of the poor
and extreme poor in 1996 have risen considerably (see
Lustig and Arias (forthcoming) for a survey of poverty
estimates). Projections of further poverty reduction
between 1996 and 1998 using elasticities of poverty
reduction to growth and actual levels of growth
observed in the region suggest only limited gains in
percentage terms, with the numbers of the poor and
extremely poor remaining constant.1
In addition to high levels of poverty, Latin
American households are affected by instability of
income and employment. While the level of instability
is often thought to be linked with the current trends
towards globalization, De Ferranti, Perry and others
(2000) show that instability has not grown over time,
and it is no worse in Latin America than in other
developing regions. Still, there is much more instability
in Latin America than in the OECD countries, and
openness may have resulted in a widening of wage
differentials between more and less skilled workers.2
Moreover, while the current changes in labour markets
should ultimately bring net positive aggregate gains,
they may induce idiosyncratic (i.e., household-specific)
shocks for individuals who lose their jobs at a time when
the region has not yet fully developed systems of social
protection.
This paper was prepared for the XII Seminario Regional de
Política Fiscal held in Chile in January 2000. It is based in part on
the last chapter of a regional study on poverty and policy (Wodon,
2000a) completed with funding from the Regional Office for Latin
America and the Caribbean of the World Bank (Chief Economist,
Guillermo Perry). The authors are grateful to Ana-María Arriagada,
Judy Baker, Charles Griffin, Margaret Grosh, Kathy Lindert and
William Maloney for the valuable discussions held with them. The
views expressed in this paper are those of the authors, and do not
necessarily represent those of the World Bank, its Executive Di-
rectors, or the countries they represent.
1
 The region has performed better in terms of non-monetary
indicators of well-being, with improvements for adult illiteracy,
infant mortality, life expectancy, gross secondary school enrollment,
and access to safe water.
2
 There is no convincing body of empirical evidence on many of
these issues. Lustig and Arias (forthcoming) argue for example that
there have been widening returns to skills, but Gill (1999) suggests
that the empirical evidence is still very much mixed. See for
example Fajnzylber and Maloney (1999).
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In these circumstances, it should not be surprising
that there is some degree of malaise in the region. While
average levels of real per capita income have risen in
the majority of Latin American and Caribbean countries
in the 1990s, this may not yet have been translated into
improvements in subjective perceptions of welfare.
Table 2 presents the results of a 1999 opinion survey
conducted by the Wall Street Journal in fourteen Latin
American and Caribbean countries. Almost two-thirds
of the respondents believe that their parents had a better
life than they do, and less than half believe that their
children will have a better life than themselves. This
pessimism probably reflects both a feeling of economic
insecurity and the relative Latin American and Caribbean
lack of progress in reducing poverty observed over the
last two decades and documented above.
There are no easy answers to the difficulties and
uncertainties faced by poor households in Latin America
and the Caribbean. Macroeconomic policies promoting
stable and broad-based economic growth certainly help
in reducing poverty, but they are not enough.
Governments in the region have increasingly been
concerned about establishing or strengthening systems
of social protection and safety net programmes that help
mitigate the potential impact of economic shocks before
they occur and help the poor to cope with these shocks
after they have occurred. In this paper, we focus on
publicly funded or mandated safety nets functioning
as risk-coping mechanisms. What are the characteristics
of good public safety nets? What are the main types of
safety nets currently in place in the countries of the
region? Which programmes should be protected or
expanded during economic crises? Finally, what has
been the actual record in terms of protecting the poor
through targeted public spending during crises? This
paper provides tentative answers to these questions.
Section II below introduces the reader to the main
concepts used in the literature on social protection and
safety nets within the context of the various ways in
which households are affected by, and respond to
shocks. Section III presents the main types of
programmes currently in place, with their respective
strengths and limitations. Section IV uses data on seven
Latin American countries to assess the actual record in
protecting the poor through safety nets during crises.
Finally, section V contains a brief conclusion.3
TABLE 1
Latin America and the Caribbean: Number of poor
and extremely poor, 1986-1998
Year Population Percentage of population Number of poor Percentage of population Number of extremely poor
(millions) in a state of poverty  (millions)  in a state of extreme poverty  (millions)
1986 407.38 33.75 137.49 13.32 54.26
1989 430.98 38.26 164.89 17.59 75.81
1992 454.65 39.65 180.27 18.65 84.79
1995 478.21 36.92 176.56 15.94 76.23
1996 486.06 36.74 178.58 16.10 78.26
1998 501.87 35.83 179.84 15.55 78.05
Source: Wodon (2000a). Poverty numbers for 1998 are based on projections, not surveys.
TABLE 2
Latin America and the Caribbean: Subjective perceptions
of changes in living standards
(Percentages)
Better Same Worse No reply
Taking everything into consideration, would you say that your parents lived better,
the same, or worse than how you live today? 61.2 22.0 14.4 2.4
And regarding your children, do you believe that they will live better, the same,
or worse than how you live today? 46.1 20.7 22.0 11.2
Source: 1999 poll by the Wall Street Journal, quoted by Rodrick (1999).
3
 Several authors have recently reviewed the literature on social
protection, safety nets, and crises. They include Klugman (1999)
for safety nets, Dar and Tzannatos (1999) on active labour market
programmes, Karni (1999) on unemployment insurance, and
Ezemenari and Subbarao (1999) on social assistance. The Inter-
American Development Bank (in February 1999) and the World
Bank (in June 1999) have held conferences on these topics. For a
discussion of social protection within the context of globalization,
see also De Ferranti, Perry and others (2000).
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II
The goal: designing good safety nets
and social protection systems
A recent World Bank paper on social protection strategy
(World Bank, 1999; see also Holzmann and Jorgensen,
1999) places social protection in the context of social
risk management. It divides social risk management
strategies into three types: risk reduction, risk mitigation
and risk coping. Risk reduction covers macroeconomic
management, regulations, and institutional development
policies that help prevent crises from occurring. While
these prevention policies are important, they are too
general to be part of the social protection system, which
consists mainly of mitigation and coping strategies. Risk
mitigation strategies are put in place before a shock, to
reduce its impact once it occurs. They include for
example income diversification and insurance
mechanisms, both formal and informal. Risk coping
strategies, for their part, are implemented after a shock
to deal with the impacts of the shock not covered by
risk mitigation policies. Table 3, taken from Gill (1999),
provides an overview of some of the main government
and private sector policies.
In this paper, we focus on publicly provided or
mandated instruments for assisting private individuals
in coping with shocks (the bottom cell in the middle
column of table 3). This does not mean that we do not
take into account private coping strategies4. There are
of course linkages between private and public coping
strategies (see for example Ezemenari, 1997, for
transfers). As mentioned in the introduction, some
private short-term strategies may have permanent
effects that make it difficult to reduce poverty in the
longer term. This is the case when the nutrition of
certain family members suffers. It is also the case if
children are removed from school and are put to work5.
In more general terms, publicly funded or mandated
social protection programmes and safety nets represent
an attempt to protect the poor against the risks that arise
from shocks, whether the shocks are foreign or
domestically induced, and whether they are covariant
or idiosyncratic. As already mentioned, an economic
crisis produces a covariant shock, whereby many people
are affected at the same time. But even in normal times,
households can be affected by idiosyncratic shocks such
as death, illness or loss of employment. One should
differentiate between the social safety nets which should
be in place at all times to deal with idiosyncratic shocks,
and the programmes which are specifically designed
to help large numbers of poor people suffering from
temporary adverse covariant shocks (World Bank,
1999).
There are usually more mechanisms available for
coping with idiosyncratic than for covariant shocks, and
the fiscal implications of the two types of shocks are
clearly different. However, even among the programmes
5
 Although the substitution effects between work and schooling
are likely to be partial due to the possibility for the parents to reduce
the time devoted by the children to leisure (Ravallion and Wodon,
2000a), it has been estimated that on average, for six Latin American
countries, the reduction in the probability of going to school when
a child is performing paid work varies from 21% to 67% depending
on the sample (Wodon and Siaens, 2000; the estimates include
controls for a wide range of other variables affecting the decision
to go to school and/or to work, so that they are net marginal effects).
This substitution between work and schooling reduces the human
capital endowment of working children to the extent that working
children may expect on average a loss of about 7% of their
discounted lifetime earnings when they are put to work, even after
taking into account their positive earnings when working as children
and the higher level of experience accumulated because of work at
an early age. Clearly, the magnitude of the long-term losses due to
child labour calls for the design of programmes that help parents
keep their children in school, especially during economic crises.
4
 To cope with the income losses induced by shocks, the poor adopt
a wide variety of strategies. These may include moving from formal
to informal sector employment; working longer hours and/or
working at a second job; promoting the labour force participation
of additional family members such as spouses and children; selling
(or consuming in the case of farmers) productive and other assets,
including stocks; migrating temporarily or permanently in order
to search for employment opportunities; reducing consumption
patterns, including restricting the food intake of family members,
taking children out of school to reduce education expenditures, or
postponing health care expenditures; relocating and/or restructuring
households, for example by having several families living under
one roof; and drawing on outside help both in kind and in cash,
including support from local communities, friends and relatives,
and private institutions such as NGOs (this in turn highlights the
role of social capital). An interesting paper about the gender
dimension of these strategies is Cunningham (1998).
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designed to deal with covariant shocks, one can identify
a number of alternatives. These include:
– Emergency employment programmes involving
public works, often using labour-intensive meth-
ods, commonly called “workfare”;
– Social funds which establish special programmes,
usually in rural areas, for financing small-scale pub-
lic works identified by local community groups;
– Nutrition and food interventions, particularly those
targeted at vulnerable groups such as children and
pregnant women. These may take many forms,
including food distribution, food stamps, and food
served in schools or community kitchens;
– Systems of direct cash grants targeted at the poor-
est, which may be conditioned on favourable
behaviour (such as school attendance and/or visits
to health centres);
– Other instruments, such as pensions and unemploy-
ment insurance, including systems of mandatory
severance payments upon termination.
Another way of organizing the discussion is to look at
the programmes in terms of the age groups they serve,
in view of the fact that the different age groups have
different needs.6 People in the youngest age groups are
generally at greater nutritional risk than other groups,
while for adults, the principal problem may be one of
employment. For the elderly, the critical problems are
maintaining sufficient income to meet basic needs, and
adequate health care access.
Within Latin America and the Caribbean, almost
all the countries currently have some mix of the above
programmes in varying degrees. However, very few if
any of the programmes completely fulfill the criteria
of an ideal safety net, which should have the following
characteristics:7
– It should be based on a sound analysis of who is
likely to be affected the most by crises, and what
kinds of coping mechanisms are normally used by
those affected;
– It should provide sufficient coverage of the popu-
lation to be reached, particularly the most vulner-
able and excluded groups;
– It should be well targeted on the poor, with clear
eligibility and termination rules, so that access is
simple and predictable;
– It should be supervised by well-functioning insti-
tutions already in place;
– It should be counter-cyclical (i.e., it should receive
more funding when there is an economic crisis), and
in some cases it should be implemented automati-
cally according to pre-agreed triggers, such as a rise
above a given level of unemployment or poverty;
TABLE 3
Latin America and the Caribbean: Classification of
government and private risk management measures
Nature of measure Government Private sector
Mainly prevention Macroeconomic policies Infrastructure investments
(risk-reducing) Financial regulations Human capital investments
Regulatory Infrastructure investments Portfolio diversification
Taxpayer-funded Labour-related regulations
Universal Human capital investments
Mainly insurance Unemployment insurance Individual savings
(risk-mitigating) Severance funds Sale of assets (e.g. land)
Inter-temporal transfers Job protection statutes Labour force participation
Premium-funded Public works guarantees
Non-poor and poor
Mainly assistance Public works programmes Inter-household transfers
(risk-coping) Means-tested cash transfers Community solidarity
Within-period transfers Conditional cash transfers Support from NGOs
Taxpayer-funded Commodity transfers Public-private partnerships
Targeted: focus on poor
Source: Gill (1999).
6
 This idea was suggested by Ana María Arriagada. See Appendix
for details. 7 For a fuller discussion of the criteria see Grosh (1995).
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– It should be fiscally sustainable;
– It should be able to provide benefits quickly, with
as large as possible a share of the costs being spent
on net increases in incomes;
– It should complement, not substitute for, private
safety net programmes and other social protection
mechanisms;
– It should be scaled back when the crisis is over.
III
The tools: types of safety nets
and social protection programmes
1. “Workfare” programmes
These programmes provide employment through
specifically designed public works projects. The classic
example is “Trabajar” in Argentina. In this programme,
projects are identified by local governments, NGOs and
community groups, and can provide employment for
no more than 100 days per participant. Project proposals
are reviewed by a regional committee, and projects with
higher poverty and employment impacts are specially
favoured8. Workers hired by the project are paid by the
government, specifically the Ministry of Labour. The
other costs are financed by local authorities. Examples
of eligible projects include the construction or repair
of schools, health facilities, basic sanitation facilities,
small roads and bridges, community kitchens and
centres, and small dams and canals9
The projects financed by “Trabajar” are limited to
poor areas as identified by a poverty map. Moreover,
wages are set to be no higher than 90% of the prevailing
market wage, so that the workers have an incentive to
return to private sector jobs when these are available.
Thus, the programme involves self-targeting as well as
geographic targeting. Overall, targeting of the poor
under “Trabajar II” (the second round of the project)
has been reported to be quite good, with 75% of the
funds reaching the bottom 20% of the income
distribution, and 40% reaching the bottom 5%.
However, the supply of jobs in the programme depends
on budgetary allocations as well as the ability of local
communities to identify viable projects. As good as it
is, “Trabajar” has provided employment to no more than
1% or 2% of the labour force, at a time when
unemployment has ranged from 13% to 18% of that
force.
Large “workfare” programmes were also
implemented by the government of Chile during the
period 1975-1988. The objective of these programmes
was to absorb workers displaced from the public sector,
and to reduce unemployment during the adjustment
period. As in the case of “Trabajar”, these programmes
provided employment in emergency public works,
including maintenance and repairs to roads and schools,
construction of parks, forestry projects, etc. The
programmes were administered by municipalities, and
were gradually built up to a peak in 1983, when they
employed about 13% of the total work force (over
500,000 workers), while the unemployment rate stood
8
 In a recent reform of the “Trabajar” programme, several steps
were taken to improve its performance. The focus of the reform
was placed on increasing community participation and funding in
the choice of the projects to be financed. “Trabajar” now works in
collaboration with local community groups, NGOs and
municipalities which present projects for selection. Projects must
first be approved for technical feasibility. Next, they are selected
on a points basis. More points are awarded to projects which are
located in poorer areas, yield larger public benefits, are sponsored
by well-regarded community groups or NGOs, and reduce labour
costs below the minimum wage. These new features have improved
targeting both at the geographic and individual levels. The
involvement of local groups has also improved the quality of
monitoring and feedback for the projects.
9
 These activities are fairly similar to those financed by social funds
(see below). One of the differences between a social fund project
and a workfare project is that the workfare project is likely to be
supervised by local authorities, rather than by independent agencies,
and execution is typically not contracted to the private sector, but
is carried out by the sponsoring agency, which can include local
and provincial governments, private groups, and national
organizations. Another difference is that workfare programmes have
the generation of employment and income as their priority, while
social funds focus more on the quality of the infrastructure
produced.
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at 17%. The programmes were gradually reduced as
private sector employment increased, and finally phased
out completely in 1988. The two largest programmes
offered manual labour at very low wages, to ensure self-
targeting. Most of the workers were unskilled, and they
received one-fourth of the then current minimum wage
(about one-half of the market wage). A quarter of the
participants were women. However, while the
programme was considered successful in terms of
reducing poverty and the social impact of
unemployment, the quality of the public works
produced was notably low, particularly as the
programme expanded in size. In addition, it is not clear
that all the workers in the programme would have been
unemployed without the programme. An evaluation
found that 32% of the participants had no work
experience prior to participating in the programme, and
46% had retired voluntarily before joining the
programme. Many of those with no experience were
women who went to work for the first time (University
of Chile, 1992).
The advantages of workfare programmes include
their ability to expand quickly during a crisis, once the
basic mechanisms have been established, and to reach
the poor through area targeting and, within poor areas,
through self-targeting thanks to the low wages. But a
problem with these programmes is that the cost of
generating one dollar in additional income for the poor
through public works is typically large, in the range of
three dollars or more. To understand why, the measure
of cost effectiveness and its decomposition proposed
in Box 1 are useful.
The measure of cost effectiveness used is the share
of total programme costs which reaches the poor
through net increases in earnings. Modifying slightly
the formula provided in Ravallion (1999), as indicated
in Box 1, this share can be seen as a function of four
key parameters: the proportionate wage gain, the
targeting performance, the wage share, and the budget
leverage. A reasonable value for the proportionate wage
gain may be 0.5, because workfare wages are low and
the poor typically find some other way to generate
resources, for example through part-time informal
employment, when they do not have access to the
programmes. Because of the self-selection involved and
the priorities given to poor areas, targeting performance
may be good, at about 0.8. The wage share can often
be obtained from administrative records by multiplying
the number of work days created by the programme by
the wage rate, and dividing this amount by the total
cost of the programme. In many cases, the wage share
will not exceed 0.7. Finally, when the programme is
almost entirely financed by the central government
(even though project selection may be done at the local
level), the budget leverage is equal to one (in the case
of “Trabajar” there is budget leverage, but while this
saves money for the central government, it still has to
be paid by local governments). The measure of cost
effectiveness is obtained by multiplying the various
parameters10. It thus typically costs three or more dollars
to the national or federal government to transfer one
dollar to the poor in additional wages.
The notion that it costs three or more dollars to
transfer one dollar of income to the poor through
workfare could be challenged, in that the benefits could
be higher for two reasons11:
First, the method presented in Box 1 does not take
into account the benefits of the public works
themselves, which can be substantial if the workers are
put to good use. The problem, however, is that these
benefits will be enjoyed during the whole life of the
infrastructure built, while what the poor need in times
of crisis is immediate income support. If the poor have
high discount rates (which they do in general, but
especially in times of crisis when their resources do
not provide for basic subsistence), the discounted value
of the benefits generated by the public works may be
quite low. Moreover, since the emphasis is on job
creation rather than investments, there may be a bias
towards “make work” or prestige projects which may
not be very valuable. This may be particularly true in a
crisis, when a rapid expansion of the programme
exhausts the backlog of viable projects.
Second, the method presented in Box 1 assumes
that only the net proportionate wage gain must be taken
into account for measuring the programme’s impact.
But in periods of high unemployment, it could be argued
that at least part of the difference between the public
works wage and what the programme participant would
have earned by himself without the programme will be
available as earnings for another worker who does not
participate in the programme and who is also
10
 In our illustrative examples, this measure would be equal to
0.5*0.8*0.7=0.28, in which case the total cost of generating one
dollar in net additional wage earnings for programme participants
is 1/0.28=3.6 dollars. For an example of the econometric methods
that can be used to measure with some precision the net wage benefit
of workfare programmes using household surveys (i.e. the parameter
NWB/W), see Jalan and Ravallion (1998).
11
 For a fuller discussion of these points, see Wodon (2000b) and
Maloney (2000).
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underemployed. At the extreme, the whole wage rate
could be taken into account in the cost-benefit analysis,
which would greatly enhance the cost-effectiveness of
such programmes.
On the other hand, arguments could also be put
forward to argue that the net transfers to the poor are
lower than predicted by the decomposition in Box 1.
For example:
First, since workers are paid by local authorities,
the opportunities for corruption and political bias are
more pronounced. With “Trabajar”, there remains some
evidence of political influences in the choice of
participants and gender discrimination (few women are
selected in some areas).
Second, the poorest communities may not always
be well positioned to submit proposals for projects and/
or to contribute to non-wage costs. In this case, the
targeting performance of the programme may suffer,
because the contribution of geographic targeting to
overall targeting performance will be reduced.
Apart from Argentina and Chile, the experience of
Mexico is also valuable for the assessment of the
strengths and limitations of workfare programmes. In
Mexico’s rural areas the Programa de Empleo Temporal
(PET) provides off-season temporary employment below
the minimum wage through public works. Employment
is for up to 88 working days at 90% of the minimum
wage. In 1999, 93 million work days and one million
jobs were to be created. PET is an example of a
programme which functions in normal times rather than
only during crises, although it is restricted to certain
periods of the year only. As expected, the projects are
labour-intensive. Examples include irrigating land,
paving roads, clearing land, improving housing, and
installing water and sewerage systems. The data suggest
good targeting, with the participants being poor and
needing the temporary jobs more than non-participants
because they do not benefit from occupations that keep
them employed all year long. Yet, the programme does
not reach the smallest (and probably poorest) rural
communities. On average, PET communities are almost
twice as large as non-PET communities. PET communities
have better access than non-PET communities to
electricity (74% versus 60%), public phones (33%
versus 19%), pre-school education (81% versus 67%),
primary schools (89% versus 82%), and tele-secondary
Box 1
MEASURING THE COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF PUBLIC WORKS
In the spirit of Ravallion (1999), let us assume that without public works, an individual has a probability F* of
finding employment at market wage W*. Expected earnings are F*W*. With public works, the individual earns
the public works wage W. If the individual can continue to search for private or self-employment while partici-
pating in public works, with probability F of finding such employment, the expected wage with public works is
FW*+(1-F)W. The net wage benefit from the programme for the worker is NWB = (1-F)W - (F* - F)W*. If the
worker gets unemployment benefits or a subsistence allowance S, the wage benefit is reduced to NWB = (1-F)W
- (F* - F)W* - (1-F*)S. If the programme costs G to the government per worker employed, a measure of cost-
effectiveness is the share of public expenditures transferred to workers as wage gain NWB/G. This measure can
be decomposed as follows:
NWB 
=
 C (W+L) W NWB
G G C (W+L) W
budget wage leverage share targeting proportionate
performance wage gain
The determinants of cost-effectiveness are a) the leverage ratio C/G, where C is the total cost per worker includ-
ing community funding; b) the wage share (W+L)/C, where W stands for wages paid to the poor and L stands for
leakage due to wages paid to the non-poor; c) the targeting performance W/(W+L) which is the percentage of
wages reaching the poor; and d) the proportionate wage gain NWB/W. This model can be extended to take into
account the benefits of the infrastructure built by public works, but these benefits are not as immediate (see
Wodon, 2000b, for a model and a discussion).
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schools (distance education) (22% versus 11%). Part
of the problem may be due to the higher (e.g.,
administrative) cost of reaching very small rural
communities.
One might also consider job training programmes
as a safety net, particularly if they can be modified
during times of crisis. In Mexico, the Probecat
programme was implemented in 1986 as a response to
the growth in unemployment that followed the 1982
debt crisis and the subsequent structural adjustment
policies. Today, the programme provides training for
close to 500,000 beneficiaries per year in urban areas.
A new evaluation of the programme suggests, however,
that it does not have a statistically significant impact
on employment and wages (Wodon and Minowa, 1999;
see Revenga, Riboud and Tan, 1994, and STPS, 1998,
for previous evaluations). These disappointing results
are not very surprising, because most retraining
programmes in OECD countries have been found to have
limited impacts. One reason for this may be that the
training is provided for too short a period of time (a
few months) to provide skills valuable in the long run.
Some job training programmes may in fact function as
safety nets by providing temporary relief for the
unemployed with a self-targeting mechanism not unlike
that of public works programmes, since participants
typically receive only the minimum wage. It is probably
better to choose one goal or the other (training versus
social protection), rather than trying to meet both goals
with a single programme.
2. Social investment funds
Social investment funds (SIFs) were the original World
Bank response to the social aspects of adjustment
programmes, and some of the earliest funds (e.g.,
Bolivia’s Emergency Social Fund created in 1991) were
designed primarily to provide employment (Jorgensen,
Grosh and Schacter, 1992). In fact, SIFs were started in
part to avoid the problems associated with emergency
public works (workfare) programmes. Yet almost all
SIFs now have evolved into programmes designed to
provide small-scale social infrastructure, particularly
in rural and poor areas, using projects generated and
executed at the local level. Therefore, social funds are
not safety nets per se. Note that unlike workfare
programmes, some social funds also finance
programmes that do not involve construction or main-
tenance, such as nutrition programmes, technical as-
sistance and micro-credit. When construction work is
involved, it is not rare to see social funds using skilled
manpower paid at market wages. This is because the
quality of the infrastructure built is considered to be
more important than the provision of employment for
the poor. This is the case with the Honduras social fund,
which originated from the transformation of an em-
ployment generation programme in the early 1990s but
does not consider the objective of employment creation
as its main priority nowadays. On the other hand, most
social funds are usually targeted to poor areas through
the use of a poverty map (or, in some cases, through
the use of a map of unmet basic needs).
While both workfare and social fund programmes
build projects in the public sector, there are important
differences. The social fund finances the material and
labour costs of a project, although some local labour
may be donated as a community contribution. This
varies across SIFs and countries. A workfare programme
generally finances the labour cost of a project at the
national or federal level, and asks that local
governments or agencies provide for the material costs.
Thus, there is a clear incentive in workfare programmes
for the local agency to find labour-intensive methods
of construction and choose labour-intensive projects.
Since SIF projects are bid out to the private sector, often
the most modern and capital-intensive construction
methods are used, although in some cases social funds
specify minimum employment levels to be attained in
their operations.
Most social funds are agencies which are
independent of the ministries -often attached to the
Office of the country’s President- which review and
fund projects submitted by NGOs, local governments and
other sponsoring agents. Their strong points include
local community involvement and the ability to respond
to local perceptions of needs, especially in rural areas
where normal government expenditures often do not
reach the poor. Social funds also have a better ability
to avoid corruption and “make-work” projects. But they
are not very good at providing safety nets, and they do
not normally expand during a crisis to provide more
employment. In fact, the amount of employment and
income generation provided by social funds has
historically been low. For instance, a review of social
funds found that 10 major social funds provided
employment on average equal to only 4% of the labour
force (Goodman, Morley and others, 1997). Likewise,
the monetary contribution in terms of wages was judged
to be small, as well as the poverty reduction impact
coming from the projects themselves. Social funds are
better at improving the supply of health, education, and
basic infrastructure services, with in some cases impacts
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on outcomes such as school enrollment rates, age-for-
grade, or the incidence of illnesses (recent evaluations
using household-level data include Pradhan, Rawlings
and Ridder, 1998, for Bolivia, and ESA Consultores,
1999, for Honduras).
Still, one of the clear advantages of social funds is
that they have strong organizations with relatively good
systems for project management and monitoring. These
organizations can be used in times of crisis for the
delivery of social safety nets. The existing social fund
in Honduras, for instance, has proven highly valuable
in directing emergency assistance to local villages after
Hurricane Mitch. One possibility therefore is to work
with social investment funds to modify their operations
during a crisis, as for example by putting more emphasis
on labour- intensive projects and by having the fund
involved in new, hard-hit areas. It is thus a good idea to
identify labour- intensive projects in advance of a
potential crisis, so that they will be ready for funding
should a crisis come about.
3. Nutrition and food programmes
Nutrition and food programmes take a variety of forms.
Subbarao, Bonnerjee and others (1997) have identified
about thirty countries using food policies with redis-
tributive aims. In these countries, price subsidies are
used as often as feeding programmes and “food-for-
work” requirements, and much more often than food
quantity rationing and food stamps. In fact, many
workfare programmes now providing wages in cash
initially started as food-for-work programmes. As for
direct feeding programmes, these provide food to needy
recipients, through direct delivery of unprepared foods
from a programme warehouse, delivery of prepared
food from a community kitchen, or the provision of a
lunch or breakfast for children in school12. Evaluations
of nutrition programmes generally indicate that there
is only a small, marginal improvement in nutrition com-
pared to the case where the family receives an equiva-
lent cash grant. This is because families may substitute
free food for their own purchases, and largely use the
savings for other purposes. However, even if a food
programme is roughly equivalent in effect to a cash
grant, there are fewer possibilities of diversion of funds,
since food is less likely to be misappropriated than cash.
In addition, food is more likely to go to women, and be
used to improve the welfare of the family, while cash is
more likely to be used by men for lower-priority ac-
tivities. An intermediate alternative between cash and
food is the issue of food stamps. Food stamps have the
added benefit of not requiring a complicated system of
storage and transport of food, while making use of the
already existing private food distribution network. In
Honduras, the food stamp programme used to also cover
medicines and school books. In Jamaica, the food stamp
programme was introduced in place of general food
subsidies, and has proven effective in raising the in-
comes of the poor (Grosh, 1992).
A common way of targeting food programmes is
by linking distribution to a health programme,
particularly maternal and child health care. In this way,
the food serves as an incentive to attend the programme,
and nutrition education can help improve the use of
the food given out. As already mentioned, giving food
to women also lessens the possibilities of it being
diverted for sale in the market. Food programmes can
also be designed to be self- targeted, if the food products
given out are those consumed by the poor and not by
the middle class. Alternatively, food distribution can
take place at centres located in poor neighbourhoods.
Such approaches can reduce the administrative burden
of targeting programmes, but they increase the
possibility of leakage to the non-poor. School lunch
and breakfast programmes are also difficult to target at
the individual level if it is desired to avoid stigmatizing
some students within the school as being “poor.” In
many countries, schools from poor areas are targeted,
but completely untargeted national programmes are also
common. One benefit of these programmes is the
incentive given to keep the children in school in order
to have them fed, and the fact that they improve their
learning abilities while in school (see Wodon and
Siaens, 1999a, for an evaluation of the Mexican school
breakfast programme). From a nutritional point of view,
however, the prime beneficiaries of the programmes
may be other members of the family, if the children are
not fed at home because the parents know that they
will receive a school lunch.
Food subsidies are another way to help the poor
by reducing the cost of their consumption bundle
(Besley and Kanbur, 1988). Means-tested food
subsidies tend to be more effective than other subsidies
in reducing inequality and improving welfare. For
Mexico, for example, Wodon and Siaens (1999b)
suggest that universal subsidies do not perform well
for the reduction of inequality and the improvement of
12
 School feeding programmes are especially popular in Latin
America. See for example Phillips, Sáenz and others (1995) on
Honduras, Dall’Acqua (1991) on Brazil, and Jacoby, Cueto and
Politt (1996) on Peru.
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welfare. They compare three programmes: the now
defunct universal subsidy for tortillas, a programme
providing one kilogramme of free tortillas for
households with income below two minimum wages,
and a subsidized milk programme, also means-tested.
Their main findings were as follows:
– Food subsidies are better than non-food subsidies.
Subsidies for basic consumption goods such as
tortillas reduced inequality, especially in urban
areas, and more so than subsidies for utilities such
as water and electricity. However, food subsidies
generate price distortions and they are costly.
Furthermore, a universal subsidy for tortillas is less
effective than would be a similar generalized
subsidy for the ingredients needed for making
tortillas, such as corn flour.
– Within food subsidies, means-tested subsidies are
better than universal subsidies. The marginal
impact on inequality and welfare achieved with the
universal tortilla subsidies does not come close to
the welfare gains achieved with the means-tested
subsidies.
Still, food subsidies may not represent a sound and cost-
effective investment for poverty reduction. Food sub-
sidies and distribution systems can have negative in-
centive effects on the supply of labour (Sahn and
Alderman, 1995). They can be badly targeted, with high
leakage to the non-poor (Grosh, 1994; Cornia and
Stewart, 1995). And, while self-targeting can be
achieved to some extent by subsidizing goods con-
sumed in larger quantities by the poor than by the non-
poor, this is no panacea (Tuck and Lindert, 1996). There
has therefore been a tendency to reduce funding for
food subsidies in favour of other programmes, for ex-
ample in Mexico (Levy and Dávila, 1998).
4. Conditional cash transfers
Since food is fungible with money, one could argue
that cash grants are the simplest and most direct way
of providing safety net assistance. The use of cash grants
also avoids the utility losses associated with in-kind
support. In developed countries, and some advanced
Latin American countries, cash payments to selected
households are slowly becoming more common.
Unconditional cash payments and similar forms of
social assistance are usually targeted to women with
dependent children, the disabled, the aged, and those
unable to work. However, the problems of targeting
and controlling cash payments make this approach
difficult in poorer countries that lack good
administrative arrangements. For instance, in Bolivia
the Bonosol programme gave adult citizens an annual
cash grant equal to four weeks’ pay at the minimum
wage. The attractiveness of the grant and the lack of
screening or identification mechanisms resulted in
widespread abuses, however, including double
payments and payments to non-Bolivians.
An attractive alternative is to link cash grants to
school attendance or other desirable behaviour. This
system has been introduced in various degrees in such
countries as Brazil (Bolsa Escola), Argentina (Beca
Secundaria), Mexico (Progresa), and Honduras (PRAF),
among others13. These programmes are not safety nets
properly speaking, or at least they were not originally
designed to function as compensatory safety nets during
crises. Yet the programmes do provide valuable benefits
which households can rely upon during crises, and these
benefits can be increased during a recession if need be.
In other words, as was the case with job training
programmes and social investment funds, existing
programmes providing conditional cash transfers can
be expanded and modified to serve as safety nets during
a crisis. In general, however, school-related grants will
offer only a partial response to crisis situations, if only
because the programmes are targeted at families with
children already in school, so that some of the poorest
who cannot afford to send their children to school are
excluded from the programmes’ coverage.
School-based conditional cash transfer
programmes reduce the opportunity cost for poor
parents of keeping their children in school. This
opportunity cost is essentially the loss of child wages
or of the value for the parents of the domestic work
done by the children, which cannot be enjoyed when
the children go to school. In many cases, this
opportunity cost of schooling is difficult to estimate,
and it is by no means obvious that the grants must
necessarily be equal to the opportunity cost in order to
persuade parents to send their children to school
(Ravallion and Wodon, 2000a). Indeed, it is reasonable
to think that the parents have an intrinsic interest in
having their children go to school, either for altruistic
13
 A rigorous evaluation of Mexico’s Progresa scheme is being
prepared by the Progresa staff with support from the International
Food Policy Research Institute. Preliminary results are available
in Progresa (1999). The International Food Policy Research Institute
is also going to help in the evaluation of Honduras’s Family
Allowance Programme (PRAF), with a design combining demand-
and supply-side interventions.
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motives, or for the future benefits that intergenerational
transfers provide once the children reach adulthood. In
some countries, however, the level of conditional grants
appears to be high. In the case of Progresa in Mexico,
for example, in order to justify the relatively high level
of the Progresa grants it has been argued that apart from
providing incentives to accumulate human capital, they
also improve the families’ overall quality of life. Yet
there may be more cost-effective ways of improving
the quality of life of the programme’s beneficiaries. On
the other hand, as shown by Wodon, González, and
Siaens (2000), when the value of the grants is low,
demand-side schooling interventions may exclude the
poorest. More work is needed to measure the many
trade-offs involved.
At what level of schooling should the grants be
provided? This will depend on the characteristics of
the country. In Brazil and Argentina, the programmes
focus on secondary school students, since these are the
children who are more likely to be pulled out of school
during a crisis. In Honduras, the programme focuses
on the first four years of primary school. In Mexico,
the programme covers the end of primary schooling
and the lower secondary school cycle. In Venezuela,
the programme covers primary school children. In some
cases, these programmes are tied not only to attendance
but also to school performance, including passing on
to the next grade. While this may provide valuable
incentives, one has to make sure that such conditions
do not exclude the poorest children, who may have
more difficulties in succeeding at school.
How should the grants be targeted? The experience
of Progresa is interesting (Skoufias, Davis and
Behrman, 2000). The programme uses a three-stage
targeting mechanism. First, poor rural localities are
selected for participation. Next, poor families are
selected within participating communities, using a
multivariate discriminant analysis. Third, local
communities may review Progresa’s selection and
reclassify poor families as non-poor and vice versa. This
targeting mechanism is basically sound, and the results
appear to be good. One concern is that the level of
community involvement remains marginal. The
targeting process is centralized in part due to the desire
to avoid political interference in the choice of
beneficiaries. Nevertheless, more efforts could be made
to promote the role of communities in targeting.
Another related question relates to the need for targeting
within poor communities. The higher the proportion
of the poor in a community, the less the need to target
within that community, especially if targeting is costly
not so much administratively but rather in terms of
social cohesion (those who do not get into the
programme may envy those who benefit from it). In
Honduras, where the PRAF programme is being modified
in part on the basis of Progresa’s experience, it has been
decided to provide support to all the families residing
in the poor communities that participate14.
Conditional cash transfer programmes can also be
used to promote good health practices, including the
consultation of local health providers. This is again the
case with Mexico’s Progresa scheme, where eligible
families receive a transfer (both in cash and in kind
through a nutritional supplement) for health purposes
apart from the transfers related to schooling. In other
words, Progresa aims at providing coordinated
intervention for education, health and nutrition, in the
hope that the impact of the whole programme will be
larger than that of its individual parts. Of course, with
Progresa as with the other programmes, in maximizing
the impact of the school- and/or health-based
interventions it is important to take care of supply-side
issues. For example, Progresa has been successful in
raising school enrollment and attendance at health care
centres, but this has led to tensions on the supply side.
Steps have been taken to coordinate Progresa’s action
with that of other ministries, such as those of education
and health, but more may be needed to optimize
demand- and supply-side interventions.
5. Unemployment insurance and other
programmes
Unemployment insurance is common in Europe and
North America, but relatively rare in Latin America,
partly because of its high cost. On the other hand, the
current labour legislation in many Latin American and
Caribbean countries mandates a severance payment on
termination which is a function of the number of years
worked. Normally, this is about one month’s salary for
every year of service, up to some maximum. This may
be supplemented by an unemployment insurance
scheme (as in Argentina and Brazil for formal-sector
workers) in which monthly contributions from payrolls
and/or the employer entitle workers to a monthly pay-
ment over a limited time horizon, with the payment set
low enough to reduce disincentive effects. But since
the formal sector in many countries is less than half of
14
 It is important, when feasible, to use distributional weights in
the evaluation of the targeting of social programmes and other
interventions. For such an analysis, see for example Ravallion and
Wodon (2000b), and Wodon and Yitzhaki (2000).
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the total work force, the coverage of unemployment
insurance/severance payments is far from complete, and
the exclusion of the informal and rural sectors means
that these mechanisms miss those areas which contain
many of the poor. Moving from a severance pay sys-
tem to an unemployment insurance system could be
beneficial if it reduces labour costs. However, unem-
ployment insurance can also create moral hazard prob-
lems by subsidizing unemployment (as compared to
workfare programmes, which subsidize employment).
One important element here is to ensure that unem-
ployment benefits are not so generous as to discourage
the search for work. For this, both the level of the pay-
ments and the length of time workers can receive ben-
efits must be monitored (for a review of OECD experi-
ence with labour market rigidities and unemployment
insurance, see Nickell, 1997).
An alternative frequently mentioned is a system
of Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts (UISAs),
under which workers would receive no “reward” upon
losing their jobs, and they would suffer no “penalty”
for finding a new job quickly. Each employed worker
would make a fixed mandatory minimum contribution
to his/her UISA each month, and additional voluntary
contributions above the mandatory minimum levels
would be permitted. Upon becoming unemployed, an
individual worker would be entitled to withdraw a fixed
maximum amount per month from his or her UISA
(smaller withdrawals would also be permitted). When
the individual’s UISA balance falls to zero, or is seriously
depleted, he/she would be entitled to unemployment
assistance. The unemployment assistance would be
financed through a tax levied on all wage earners. When
workers retire with a positive balance in their UISA, they
would be able to use that balance to top-up their
pensions. Overall, the workers themselves would play
a much larger role in financing their own support during
periods of unemployment. The main advantage of UISAs
is that they tend to set the incentives right, without
creating distortions in the behaviour of employers and
firms, since the funds taken out by an unemployed
individual from his/her UISA directly reduce the
individual’s personal wealth by an equal amount, so
that individuals fully internalize the cost of
unemployment compensation. UISA systems are not
without risks, and special interventions are likely to be
needed to protect those workers who are younger,
poorer and less well educated. For Chile, Castro-
Fernández and Wodon (2000) suggest that although the
redistributive impact per dollar spent on unemployment
benefits of a UISA-based system would probably be
smaller than the redistributive impact of Chile’s current
unemployment assistance system, the complementary
unemployment assistance component of the system
would still be highly redistributive, and it would
probably have a much better coverage because the value
of the benefits would be higher.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that there are several
other types of social protection programmes that exist,
including pensions for the elderly. Because many of
the poor belong to the informal sector, they do not have
access to the pensions provided by social security
systems (likewise, those in the informal sector often
lack access to other State-organized benefits such as
low-income housing). For a discussion of pension issues
for the poor, see Holzmann and Packard (1999).
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IV
The constraints: fiscal space
and administrative capacity
1. Are social protection programmes
counter-cyclical?
Good social protection programmes should expand
during an economic crisis as unemployment grows and
income levels decline. In other words, the programmes
should be counter-cyclical: i.e., rising when the
economy falls. In some countries, the system of safety
nets is supported by automatic entitlements that force
the public sector to spend more on those who need it.
For instance, unemployment causes an increase in the
numbers eligible for unemployment benefits, and
declining incomes can increase the number of
households eligible to receive cash or food assistance.
But in most Latin American countries, there are no such
automatic triggers. This is partly because the need to
have counter-cyclical social protection programmes can
conflict with the need to impose fiscal austerity during
a recession. An economic crisis, whether domestically
or externally induced, leads to a drop in output and
consequently a fall in government revenues. But during
a crisis, governments are reluctant to raise taxes, so
maintaining high expenditure levels can lead to large
budget deficits.
Let us consider the data presented in table 4. Both
Argentina and Mexico suffered adverse shocks in 1995
(Mexico was first, Argentina followed). Per capita GDP
in Argentina decreased by 5.32% between 1994 and
1995, while it went down by 4.93% in Mexico between
1994 and 1996. The share of GDP devoted to targeted
social spending decreased a little in both countries,
while the poverty rate increased, leading to an increase
in the total number of poor people. The targeted
spending per poor person decreased much more than
per capita GDP, yielding an elasticity to growth (in this
case to a recession) of targeted spending per poor person
of about five in the two countries. During this recession,
spending for the poor was thus highly pro-cyclical,
whereas ideally it should have been counter-cyclical in
order to protect the poor from the adverse
macroeconomic shock.
The data in table 4 are based on one period in two
countries only and on a number of assumptions for both
the estimation of poverty and the categorization of
social spending. It may be misleading to conclude that
social protection declines in all countries during a crisis.
Unfortunately, beyond point estimates of the elasticities
of targeted spending to growth such as those presented
TABLE 4
Argentina and Mexico: Targeted public spending
per poor person, 1994-1996
Real per capita GDP Share of targeted social Poverty rate Number of poor Targeted spending
(1994 = 100) spending in GDP (%) (%) people (million) per poor person
(1994 = 100)
Argentina
1994 100 1.24 21.6 7.5 100
1995 94.68 1.21 27.2 9.6 63.12
% change -5.32% -27.88%
Mexico
1994 100 1.36 46.95 42.04 100
1996 95.07 1.23 60.93 56.51 67.30
% change -4.93% -23.70%
Source: Wodon, Hicks and others (1999). The data for the two countries are not strictly comparable. Hence it should not be inferred that
social protection spending is more pro-cyclical in one country than in the other. Note also that the Government of Mexico has made a
substantial effort to increase targeted funding for the poor in recent years, for example by providing funding for Progresa. This is not
reflected in the table.
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in table 4, the extent to which Latin American and
Caribbean countries have provided counter-cyclical
social protection is a question which has received
surprisingly little attention. One problem is that the data
on budget expenditures do not typically identify social
protection or safety nets as a separate activity. Social
protection programmes are scattered over various
sectors such as health, education, social security, and
welfare. However, data are available in some countries.
Wodon, Hicks and others (1999) use data for seven
countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, Mexico and Panama) to test for
the business cycle properties of targeted and social
spending in Latin America. They first propose a
theoretical model to analyse how targeted public
spending for the poor may be affected by booms and
busts. A government is said to be “pro-poor” if it gives
reasonable weight to the poor in its social welfare
function, if it considers a minimum level of basic needs
that must be satisfied for the poor, if over time it raises
this level of basic needs faster than GDP during a period
of growth, and if it does not reduce the level of
minimum basic needs during a temporary recession. If
a government is pro-poor according to the above
definition, the elasticity of targeted public spending to
growth will be positive and larger than one during
booms, and smaller than one during recessions. If the
government is not pro-poor, the model predicts that the
elasticity of targeted spending will always be smaller
than or equal to one. The existence of an asymmetry
between booms and busts in the elasticity to growth of
targeted public spending for the poor when the
government is pro-poor is then tested with the panel
data on public expenditures. The results in table 5
suggest that governments are to some extent pro-poor
and pro-social, because targeted and social expenditures
are rising faster than GDP and total government spending
during booms. While this is encouraging, the fact
remains that during recessions, targeted spending is not
protected. It decreases slightly faster than GDP (although
the elasticities are not statistically different from one
in table 5 in the case of a recession). Thus, even though
governments can be considered as being pro-poor,
targeted and social spending remain highly pro-cyclical.
The evidence suggests that social protection
programmes, instead of expanding quickly during a
crisis, are actually contracting, in many cases as rapidly
as other types of public spending15.
TABLE 5
Latin America (seven countries): Estimated elasticities
of expenditures with respect to changes in GDP
Growtha Recession
Total government spending 0.971 1.003
Social sectors spending 1.475* 1.128
Social protection spending 1.999* 1.391
Source: Adapted from Wodon, Hicks and others (1999). Sample of
7 countries, with 97 observations.
a
 * denotes an elasticity statistically different from one at the 5%
level.
The impact of a recession on targeted spending on
the poor is even more negative than table 5 suggests. It
can be shown that in Latin America, a one percentage
point decrease in per capita GDP leads to at least a two
percentage point decrease in targeted public spending
per poor person. Half of this impact is due to the
reduction in per capita GDP itself, which reduces
spending even when the share of targeted spending with
respect to GDP remains constant (the fact that the share
remains constant is evidenced by the unit elasticity in
table 5). The other half of the impact comes from the
increase in poverty due to the crisis: i.e., the available
targeted public spending must be shared among a larger
number of poor people.
The fact that targeted programmes for the poor are
not well protected may be surprising, given that these
programmes represent only a small proportion of GDP
(typically 2% or less) and a small proportion of total
spending as well. One reason for the lack of protection
for targeted spending may be related to the lack of
bargaining power of the poor. Another reason why
expenditure protection may be difficult during an
economic and fiscal crisis is that the country must
honour its debt service and a number of mandatory
entitlement programmes, with consequently low levels
of discretionary resources. In other words, if 30% of
the budget is protected because of its safety net and
poverty aspects, and 50% is for debt service and other
programmes that cannot be cut, a 10% reduction in
overall spending would produce a 50% cut in the
remaining sectors. Given that the remaining sectors
might include such sensitive areas as defence, justice
and administration, this may not be a feasible solution,
thereby forcing the government to abandon the idea of
protecting funding for key social protection
programmes. One message from this discussion is that
prevention before a crisis is crucial, because during the
crisis, it will always be difficult to protect the poor.
15
 Ravallion (2000) finds somewhat similar evidence with data for
Argentina.
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2. How can one select the programmes to be
protected or expanded during a crisis?
The objective during a crisis should be first to agree that
key programmes that benefit the poor will not be cut back
even though total government expenditures may be reduced.
Next comes the difficult question of which specific
programmes should be protected or even expanded. It is
tempting to put on the list almost all programmes in basic
health, education and nutrition. But not all programmes in
the social sectors are equally effective in reducing poverty,
and some programmes producing long-term benefits for
the poor may be deferrable. In deciding which programmes
to keep and expand during a crisis, an important criterion
should be the cost-effectiveness of the programme in
quickly channeling income or its equivalent in kind to the
poor. As suggested in the case of workfare programmes,
the cost-effectiveness of programmes depends on a number
of parameters. Knowing these parameters beforehand
helps in making a selection. Comparison of the cost-
effectiveness of alternative safety nets in smoothing
consumption patterns for the poor via income generation,
in-kind commodity distribution or commodity subsidies
is one area where additional analytical work should clearly
be done.
One element of a viable strategy -actually, one of
the key parameters of the cost-effectiveness of safety
nets- is the protection of programmes that have good
targeting mechanisms for reaching the poor. Untargeted
or universal welfare programmes are often fiscally
impossible to sustain, particularly during a crisis. It is
true that targeting beneficiaries by complicated means
testing (i.e., intensive questioning over income and
wealth) can be costly and not very reliable. This is why
many World Bank-funded programmes have relied on
geographic targeting, even though this can lead to
substantial leakage. An alternative approach is the proxy
means test, whereby likely recipients are interviewed
and respond to questions concerning their living
conditions, such as the type of housing in which they
live, the availability of drinking water, the types of
appliances possessed by the household, etc. Wodon
(1997) has shown that these indicators are powerful
means for avoiding the two types of errors that can be
committed in targeting, namely identifying as poor a
non-poor household, and as non-poor a poor household.
For any given budget, good targeting also helps to
improve coverage among the poor (i.e., what percentage
of the poor actually receive programme benefits), which
is an important advantage in Latin America, where
coverage has often been low.
Variants of means-testing systems have been used,
among others, for the CAS (Social Action Committee)
cards in Chile, SISBEN (Beneficiary Identification
System) in Colombia, SISFAM (Beneficiary Family
Identification System) in Argentina, and Progresa in
Mexico. In practice, people who apply for assistance
are interviewed, and their score on the questionnaire
determines their eligibility. The weights for the vari-
ous indicators included in the questionnaire are based
on estimated econometric relationships between the
poverty status of a representative sample of households
and their indicators. Grosh (1994) has estimated that
the cost of targeting through proxy means testing or
geographic targeting (definition of poor areas) need not
be much higher than the cost of universal distribution
(a reasonable mark-up would be 3% to 8%), while pro-
ducing substantial benefits. In a sample of untargeted
programmes, only 33% of the benefits accrued to the
lowest 40% of the population, whereas in targeted
programmes 72% of their benefits reached that popu-
lation.
Beyond the need to protect the consumption of the
poor during a crisis, it is also clear that some existing
health and education programmes not necessarily tar-
geted to the poor should be preserved. It is possible
that the demand for these programmes might go up if,
for example, the losses in income due to unemploy-
ment or underemployment cause people to shift from
private providers and private health insurance to pub-
lic programmes. Likewise in the field of health, some
programmes not targeted on the poor should be main-
tained because there are large externalities involved.
This would be so, for example, in the cases of disease
surveillance, immunization campaigns, malaria control,
AIDS prevention, etc. Preserving access to basic (pri-
mary and lower secondary) education is not a short-
term safety net issue but, as discussed earlier, it does
reduce the costs of a crisis over the longer term by avoid-
ing cuts in education spending for the poor that even-
tually lead to a reduction in human capital, and thereby
lead to lower productivity and income.
In order to be able to protect all the above
programmes, it will be necessary to identify some
programmes that can be reduced, put on hold, or
eliminated. For example, some of the worse cases of
misspent social spending in Latin America have been
large subsidized housing programmes for the middle
class, which are often mandated through earmarked
taxes. While it may be impossible for a government to
change these programmes quickly without major
legislative or even constitutional authority, in some
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cases the need to reallocate spending due to an
emergency or a crisis may facilitate fundamental
changes. Other candidates for expenditure reduction
may include subsidies, such as below-cost pricing for
non-poor groups, for such services as electricity, water
or urban transport. Better cost recovery for higher
education (e.g., at the university level) and for some
health care services may also help. Table 6 (the idea
for which came from a discussion with K. Lindert) gives
a generic ranking based on common practice and
observation, although the priorities may change
depending on the country.
3. Additional implementation issues
There are several additional issues which must be con-
sidered when implementing safety nets. First, estab-
lishing new institutions that work effectively at the na-
tional level is difficult. Most social funds, for instance,
take 2 to 3 years to get up and running at a level that
reaches a substantial number of poor people. Under
the pressure of time, it is much easier to work with
existing institutions by providing them with support
that enables them to expand their operations during a
crisis. It is also often possible to expand safety net
programmes that have already started on a pilot basis
and that have been evaluated and proven effective. As
a corollary, it might be useful to experiment with new
programmes every now and then on a pilot basis, in
order to evaluate their strengths and weaknesses and
their ability to be expanded in case of need. Also, as
indicated earlier, it may be possible to use existing in-
stitutions running programmes for job training, social
funds, or transfers for the distribution of emergency
assistance when needed.
Second, not all governments possess the same
capacity to administer programmes. In some countries,
a simple programme that is not well targeted might be
a better choice than a more complicated programme.
Safety net programmes need to strike a balance between
administrative capacity, fiscal sustainability, political
acceptability, the scope of the intervention, and targeting
efficiency. An additional problem is the relationship
between the federal and provincial-level governments.
The staff of multilateral development banks have
traditionally established a dialogue with federal
authorities, but a large part of social spending takes
place at the provincial level. It may be necessary to
agree to additional support from the federal budget for
state, provincial or municipal budgets during a crisis if
safety net programmes are operated locally. However,
while decentralization has a number of advantages, it
is not necessarily pro-poor, so that serious monitoring
of sub-national authorities is needed.
Third, one problem encountered in many countries
is the proliferation of small programmes throughout
various parts of the government. Nutrition programmes,
for instance, are found in the ministries of health,
education, social development and agriculture, as well
as in autonomous agencies belonging to the Office of
the President. Training programmes are run by the
ministries of education, labour and economic
development. It is important to seek some sort of inter-
ministerial coordination in order to avoid overlaps and
TABLE 6
Priorities in protecting programmes during
crises: a possible hierarchy
Health Education Social protection/others
High priority Immunizations Means-tested stipends Workfare programmes
Disease control School breakfasts in poor areas Means-tested pensions for the elderly
AIDS prevention Special programmes for Means-tested nutrition supplements
Pregnancy care and indigenous populations
early child development
Moderate priority Primary health care Basic education Unemployment insurance
posts and centres (primary and lower secondary) Social security
Basic care in hospitals Scholarships for poor Social funds
students at universities Job training
Food subsidies
Low priority Advanced curative care Free/low-cost university Subsidized housing
in hospitals education for non-poor Subsidies for
Research budgets infrastructure services
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duplication. In the longer term, it may be possible to
combine or consolidate programmes, and to eliminate
the programmes that are least effective. As mentioned
earlier, a crisis can help in reorienting social budgets.
Fourth, in monitoring expenditure levels it is
preferable in principle to use actual expenditures, rather
than the amounts budgeted. However, actual
expenditure levels are difficult to monitor in many
countries because of the long lag involved in receiving
the information. By the time it is known that actual
expenditures have fallen, or that the available credits
have not been used, it may be too late. To avoid non-
intentional budget cuts due to lags in spending, it is
important, after budget allocations have been made, to
try to ensure that the budgets are set operationally and
maintained at adequate levels, with continuous
monitoring of the outlays in order to confirm that the
plans are effectively being carried out.
V
Conclusions
Economic shocks may lead to a decline in real income
caused by loss of employment, a situation of
underemployment, or a shift to less lucrative employment.
Real wages may also be reduced by high levels of inflation.
Changes in relative prices may have negative effects. The
poor may also lose their access to essential public services
for health, nutrition and education as a result of reduced
government real spending. They may lose the value of
their financial assets (however meagre) if these are not
protected from bankruptcy by the financial system or by
the public social security system. Or they may simply have
to sell their assets. In all these potential effects and in many
others, the poor are more vulnerable than the non-poor
because their income may fall far more quickly below
bare subsistence levels.
It is common practice to recommend that
governments should protect key social protection
programmes during a crisis and expand the social safety
net. However, with fiscal resources shrinking at a time
when the number of poor are increasing, it may be
extremely difficult to do this. Still, one would hope at
least that high-priority programmes will be less subject
to cuts than other programmes. This is feasible because
social safety nets represent only a small part of existing
budgets. Yet this does not appear to be the case at
present. Rather than being counter-cyclical, safety nets
are as pro-cyclical as other types of public expenditures,
and in some cases may actually be more pro-cyclical.
Ironically, social protection expenditures are not
themselves protected.
Assuming that there is an agreement to protect the
poor from budget cuts during a crisis, the question
becomes: which programmes should be protected?
There are no easy answers to this question, and the
answer is bound to be country-specific. Still, one
important criterion for the selection of the programmes
to protect or expand is their ability to quickly provide
income support or its equivalent in kind for the poor.
Workfare schemes may help, but policy-makers should
be aware that it typically costs more than three dollars
to generate one additional dollar in net earnings for the
poor through these programmes. Some nutrition and
food programmes may also be effective, provided they
are well targeted, which is not always the case. Good
targeting is one of the key parameters of the cost-
effectiveness of safety nets. Also, existing social
programmes which are not safety nets proper (e.g., job
training programmes, social funds, and conditional
stipends for school attendance in poor areas) can prove
to be valuable delivery mechanisms for emergency
assistance when there is limited administrative capacity
in the country. Apart from compensating the poor for
the likely loss of market-based income which occurs
during a crisis, it is also necessary for the government
to protect some universal programmes. These would
include primary health care and education, as well as
health programmes with large externalities. But the
most difficult task of all is to identify those programmes
that can be reduced, put on hold, or eliminated.
Candidates in this respect may include subsidized
housing, other subsidies for commodities not consumed
mainly by the poor, some social security programmes,
and spending on higher education and advanced
curative care. While it is often difficult politically to
reform these programmes, the need to act during a crisis
may facilitate the necessary fundamental changes.
(Original: English)
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APPENDIX
Main risks by age group, and role of
social protection in addressing those risks
Age group Main risks Roles of other sectors Role of social Role of social
protection: insurance protection: assistance
0-4 – Stunted child development – Primary health care services — – Early child development
– Pre-school centres
5-14 – Low education quality – Quality education — – Scholarships and schooling
– Late entry to school – Earlier entry  incentives
– Late age by grade – Reduced repetition —
15-24 – Low secondary school – Access to/quality of — – Scholarships and schooling
 completion rates secondary education  incentives
– Teen pregnancy – Remedial education
– Venereal diseases – Reproductive health —
25-64 – Low income – Labour-intensive growth – Unemployment – “Workfare” projects
(unemployment/  (with emphasis on SMEs)  insurance – Cash transfers
underemployment) – Labour market reforms – Job training
– Job search assistance
65+ – Low income – Social security
 (no pension, no assets)  (contributory pensions) – Income transfer
 (non-contributory pensions)
All groups – Low access to and – Better provision of – Health insurance – Housing subsidies
 quality of health care  health services – Relocation to safe areas
– Low housing quality – Affordable housing
– Low access to basic – Investments in basic
 infrastructure  infrastructure
– Insecure tenancy  – Titling programmes
– Risk of flooding
Source: Adapted from Arriagada (1999).
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